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Deception has been demonstrated as a task that involves executive control such as conflict
monitoring and response inhibition. In the present study, we investigated whether or not
the controlled processes associated with deception could be trained to be more efficient.
Forty-eight participants finished a reaction time-based differentiation of deception paradigm
(DDP) task using self- and other-referential information on two occasions. After the first
baseline DDP task, participants were randomly assigned to one of three groups: a control
group in which participants finished the same task for a second time; an instruction group
in which participants were instructed to speed up their deceptive responses in the second
DDP; a training group in which participants received training in speeding up their deceptive
responses, and then proceeded to the second DDP. Results showed that instruction alone
significantly reduced the RTs associated with participants’ deceptive responses. However,
the differences between deceptive and truthful responses were erased only in the training
group. The result suggests that the performance associated with deception is malleable
and could be voluntarily controlled with intention or training.
Keywords: training, intentional control, deception, instruction, differentiation of deception paradigm, automaticity
INTRODUCTION
Despite the claim that there is no unique lie-specific characteris-
tic associated with lying or deception, such as Pinochio’s nose (cf.
Rosenfeld, 1995), it has been widely accepted that lying requires
greater amount of cognitive control than telling the truth. Stud-
ies from developmental psychology found that children’s ability
to tell lies are closely related with their development of executive
control functions (Talwar and Lee, 2008). Studies from cogni-
tive psychology similarly demonstrated that lying required more
mental operations than truth (e.g., decisions to lie, construction
of lying responses), which led to prolonged reaction times (RTs,
e.g., Walczyk et al., 2003). Recently, research from cognitive neu-
roscience adds evidence that also supports the notion that lying
is more task-demanding than truth: compared with truth, lying
ubiquitously recruits brain regions that are involved in cogni-
tive control such as the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC)
and the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC, Spence et al., 2001; Lan-
gleben et al., 2002; Sip et al., 2008). A recent meta-analysis of
neuroimaging of deception showed that the brain regions involved
during lying are highly overlapped with the brain regions involved
in executive functions, especially working memory and response
inhibition (Christ et al., 2009).
This attribute of lying was recently utilized in applied research
to aid in deception detection. For instance, it has been shown that
people are generally not good at spotting liars via behavioral cues
(Bond and DePaulo, 2006). However, it was found that people are
more accurate in detecting lies when liars’ cognitive demand is
high than when liars’ cognitive demand is low. This is based on
the idea that as lying is already task-demanding, liars whose cog-
nitive demand is particularly high would find it more difficult to
manage lying as fewer resources are available, compared to liars
whose cognitive demands are low, as relatively more resources can
be used for lying (Vrij et al., 2008).
Although there are converging lines of evidence supporting
the notion that lying is more task-demanding than truth-telling,
this hypothesis should be investigated with more scrutiny given
the recent evidences. Like many other complex social behav-
iors, lying is far from a uniformed homogenous behavior. There
are increasing studies aiming to de-couple different sub-types of
deceptions. For instance, people may tell lies either about oth-
ers or about oneself; the event people may lie about could be
experienced or not-experienced; the lies could also either be spon-
taneous or be well-practiced (Ganis et al., 2003, 2009; Abe et al.,
2006; Johnson et al., 2008; Walczyk et al., 2009; Hu et al., 2011).
These studies have consistently found that different types of lies
showed different behavioral patterns, as well as non-overlapping
neural activities. Specifically, lying about experienced events was
associated with higher level of ACC activity compared to lying
about not-experienced events, which is taken to suggest the for-
mer is associated with higher conflict (Abe et al., 2006). More-
over, it has been found that rehearsed, previously memorized lies
were associated with less conflict compared with spontaneous
lies, as evidenced by decreased activities in ACC (Ganis et al.,
2003).
Although the abovementioned studies provided evidences that
how cognitive demand may vary depending on different types of
lies, whether or not the cognitive demand associated with lying can
be intentionally reduced remains an open question. So far, only a
few of studies investigated this issue. For instance, Johnson et al.
(2005) found that although practice reduced the RTs of deceptive
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responses generally, the difference between deception and truth
still remained. Walczyk et al. (2009) gave participants time to pre-
pare and practice their lies before a cognitive lie detection test.
Results showed that participants’ practiced deceptive responses
were associated with reduced RTs than deceptive responses that
had not been prepared nor practiced prior to the test (Walczyk
et al., 2009, see also DePaulo et al., 2003, for preparation’s influ-
ence on liars’ behavioral cues). Another recent study manipulated
the proportion of questions that required either honest or decep-
tive responses during a question set. It was found that when
participants must deceive frequently in a question set, the lies
became less task-demanding than when participants should tell
the truth frequently. In other words, the more questions par-
ticipants lied about, the easier it was to lie (Verschuere et al.,
2011).
In the present study, we directly investigated whether or
not lying can be trained to be more automatic and less task-
demanding. We argued that since in most previous deception
studies, participants were instructed to lie immediately after they
receive the instruction, the lying can be classified as unpracticed.
However, in real-life scenarios, liars may construct and practice
lies before the interrogation. Indeed, practice or training may help
people to improve the efficiency of knowledge retrieval, response
inhibition and even working memory capacity across various task
domains (Pirolli and Anderson, 1985; MacLeod and Dunbar, 1988;
Milham et al., 2003; Olesen et al., 2004; Walczyk et al., 2009;
Brehmer et al., 2012; Hu et al., 2012b). Since deception or lying
has been conceptualized to rely on similar executive functions,
especially working memory and response inhibition (Christ et al.,
2009), it is possible that as these general-purposes processes (e.g.,
working memory, response inhibition) are malleable upon train-
ing, deception can also be trained to be more automatic. Thus, we
hypothesized that participants who received training on decep-
tion would similarly find lying to be less demanding. Moreover,
the post-training deception may not even be distinguished from
truth.
In addition to the training condition, we also investigated the
effect of instruction on deceptive responses. It has been found
that giving participants specific instructions regarding response
pattern can have considerable effects over participants’ behavioral
performance (Verschuere et al., 2009; Hu et al., 2012b). Specifically,
participants can significantly reduce their RTs in tasks involving
response conflict and control upon mere instruction (Hu et al.,
2012b). This instruction group is also necessary for us to examine
whether or not behavior changes between pre- and post-test, if any,
can be attributed to training or to experimental instructions. For
instance, it has been argued that the benefits of training on partic-
ipants’ performance may not necessarily due to the training itself,
but can be due to factors such as participants’ expectations about
improvements (e.g., Brehmer et al., 2012). Thus, the instruction
manipulation allows us to investigate the effect of mere instruc-
tion over one’s deceptive responses. Furthermore, the comparison
between the instruction group and the training group enables
us to dissociate the behavioral change related to training from
the change that is due to instructions. This may also provide us
with a more detailed picture of the factors that may influence
deceptions.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
Forty-eight participants (nineteen males, average years= 22.23)
from Jinhua, China were recruited via advertisements on campus
and received monetary compensation for their time. They were
randomly assigned to three groups (N= 16 in each group): control
group (seven males, mean age= 22.13), instruction group (four
males, mean age= 22.5), and training group (eight males, mean
age= 22.25). Consent forms were obtained from participants
before the experiment.
MATERIALS
Three pieces of personal information from each participant were
collected for self-referential information list: full name, birth-date,
and hometown. Next, a list of names, dates, and Chinese city/town
names were provided to participants, who were instructed to select
those with special personal meanings (e.g., a city may become
relevant because participants’ relatives live there). Then three
pieces of information, a name, a date, and a town name, were
randomly selected from the list that contained only personal-
irrelevant information. These three pieces of information were
used as other-referential information.
Stimuli were presented as words using E-prime. Each item was
presented for 15 times, resulting in a total of 90 trials [3(name, date,
town)× 2(self-referential vs. other-referential)× 15] in one block.
Stimulus was presented for 300 ms in white font against a black
background on a computer monitor. The inter-stimulus-interval
was randomly varied between 1500 and 2500 ms.
EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURAL
The Differentiation of Deception Paradigm (DDP) was con-
structed following Furedy et al. (1988). The task consisted of two
blocks: in the truthful block, participants were asked to respond
to all stimuli honestly. They were asked to press one key indi-
cating “self” to their self-referential information; and to press
another key indicating “other” to the other-referential informa-
tion. In the deceptive block, participants were asked to press
“self” to the other-referential information and to press “other”
to their own information, i.e., to pretend they were someone else
while concealing their true identity. The order of the two blocks
was counterbalanced across participants. Since participants may
develop a response-mapping strategy from the first block to the
second block by merely reversing the button press without expe-
riencing being truthful or deceptive, another 30 trials of words
“SELF” and “OTHER” were included in each block as catch tri-
als. These catch trials were randomly interspersed among the self-
and other-referential information. Specifically, participants were
instructed to press the key indicating “self” to “SELF” catch trials
and to press the key indicating “other” to “OTHER” catch trials.
Importantly, this response-mapping was consistent across both
truthful and dishonest blocks (for other types of catch trials, see
Johnson et al., 2005; Hu et al., 2011). Thus, participants finished
120 trials (90 response trials and 30 catch trials) in each block.
Speed and accuracy were equally emphasized.
Upon the completion of the baseline DDP for all participants,
participants in the control group performed an irrelevant vision
illusory task for 15 min, followed by a second DDP. In the irrelevant
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task, participants watched a series of apparent motion pictures
and decided whether the dots on the picture were moving or not.
The control group aimed to control for possible effect of task
familiarity/fatigue over one’s behavioral performance across two
tests.
For participants in the instruction group, their RTs and errors
from the truthful and deceptive blocks of the baseline DDP they
just finished were calculated and shown to them. Participants were
debriefed regarding the meanings of these behavioral measures.
They were explicitly told that their deception could be inferred
from the increased RT and the decreased accuracy in the deceptive
block compared to the RTs and accuracy from the honest block (in
fact, every participants in the instruction group and the training
group (described below) showed at least one of the two behavioral
indicators associated with deception). Next they were instructed
to try their best to speed up their RTs and to reduce possible
incorrect responses during the deceptive block in the following
DDP task. After the instruction was given, participants conducted
the second DDP task in the same order as in the baseline DDP
task.
For participants in the training group, everything was the
same as in the instruction group, except that in addition to being
instructed to speed up and be more accurate, they were given 360
trials (i.e., three deceptive blocks) that required deceptive response
to improve their behavioral performance of the deceptive block.
There were two intervals during the training session in which
participants took a short break. After the training, participants
proceeded to the second DDP in the same order as in the baseline
DDP task.
RESULTS
The behavioral data from the baseline DDP and the second DDP
from three groups is presented in Figures 1 and 2. It can be
observed that the baseline deception is associated with longer RT
and reduced accuracy. However, the RTs of deception were reduced
in both the training group and the instruction group.
To statistically test our hypothesis, we first conducted a mixed-
model 3 (group as a between-subject variable: control vs. instruc-
tion vs. training) by 2 (response type as a within-subject variable:
truth vs. deception) by 2 (time as a within-subject variable: first
vs. second DDP) by 2 (stimulus type as a within-subject vari-
able: self- vs. other-referential information) analysis of variance
(ANOVA) on RTs of correct responses. This test yielded a signif-
icant main effect of response type [F(1, 45)= 116.19, p< 0.001,
η2p = 0.72], indicating that deception took significantly longer
time than truth (Mean± SE, 596.48± 11.76 vs. 520.79± 9.99 ms).
The main effect of time was also significant, F(1, 45)= 29.06,
p< 0.001, η2p = 0.39. This was due to participants’ faster RTs in
the second DDP compared to the first DDP task (540.36± 9.96 in
the second DDP vs. 576.92± 11.73 ms in the first DDP). Moreover,
stimulus type was also significant,F(1, 45)= 10.14, p< 0.01,η2p =
0.18, as self-referential information had faster RTs than other-
referential information (553.44± 10.19 vs. 563.84± 10.73 ms).
Regarding interactions, a significant two-way, stimulus type by
response interaction was significant [F(1, 45)= 83.56, p< 0.001,
η2p = 0.65]. This was because the RTs discrepancy between honest
and deceptive responses for self-referential information was larger
(497.96± 9.73 vs. 608.93± 12.19 ms) than for other-referential
information (543.64± 10.62 vs. 584.04± 12.09 ms).
Most importantly, the three-way response× time× group
interaction was significant, F(2, 45)= 8.26, p< 0.01, η2p = 0.27.
No other effects were found significant. To understand this three-
way interaction, we focused on the influence of time over response
type by conducting 2 (first vs. second DDP) by 2 (deception vs.
truthful responses) ANOVAs in three groups separately.
In the control group (see Figure 1A), there was no signifi-
cant interaction between time and responses [F(1, 15)< 1,p> 0.5,
η2p < 0.1], suggesting that differences between deception and truth
did not change across time.
In the instruction group (see Figure 1B), however, a signif-
icant time by response interaction was found: F(1, 15)= 12.16,
p< 0.01, η2p = 0.45. This suggested that mere instruction would
FIGURE 1 | Participants’ mean reaction times (RTs, in milliseconds) associated with deceptive and truthful responses in the first and the second
differentiation of deception paradigm task, in the control (A), instruction (B), and training group (C), separately. Error bars indicate ±1 Standard Error.
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FIGURE 2 | Participants’ mean accuracy (in percentage) associated with deceptive and truthful responses in the first and the second differentiation of
deception paradigm task, in the control, instruction, and training group, separately. Error bars indicate ±1 Standard Error.
significantly influence participants’ behavioral performance of
deception. To understand this interaction and to highlight our
main variable of interest (i.e., differences between deceptive and
honest responses), we calculated the differences between decep-
tion and truth blocks in the first and the second DDP separately.
A paired sample t -test showed that participants who received the
speed up instruction significantly reduced the differences between
deceptive and honest responses from the first to the second DDP
task (111.54± 12.98 vs. 62.73± 14.65 ms; t (15)= 3.49, p< 0.01,
Cohen’ d= 0.88).
Even though instruction did reduce the differences between
deceptive and truthful response from the first to the second
DDP task, it remained to be investigated whether or not RTs
can distinguish deceptive from honest response in the second
DDP task. A paired sample t -test comparing RTs of deceptive and
honest responses found that the RTs associated with deceptive
response were still longer than the RTs associated with hon-
est responses (559.65± 15.36 vs. 496.92± 14.89 ms, t (15)= 4.28,
p< 0.001, Cohen’s d= 1.04). This pattern of results suggested
that even though instruction did influence participants’ deceptive
responses, it was not sufficient to eliminate the deception-truth
differences.
In the training group (see Figure 1C), the same 2(time: first
vs. second DDP task)× 2(response: deception vs. truth) within-
subject repeated measure ANOVA resulted in a significant main
effect of time: F(1, 15)= 26.33, p< 0.001, η2p = 0.64, suggesting
that the training significantly reduced the RTs of the DDP task. The
same test also revealed a significant main effect of response type
[F(1, 15)= 20.02,p< 0.001,η2p = 0.57], suggesting that deception
and truth was significantly different. Most importantly, the time by
response interaction was significant: F(1, 15)= 17.45, p< 0.001,
η2p = 0.54.
To understand this interaction, we calculated the RTs difference
between deceptive and truthful responses (RTdeception−RTtruth)
of the first and the second DDP tasks separately. It was found
that this difference was significantly reduced after participants’
training from the first to the second DDP (108.67± 22.69
vs. 15.82± 10.93 ms, t (15)= 4.18, p< 0.001, Cohen’s d= 1.30).
Moreover, in the second, post-training DDP, RTs for deceptive
responses were not different from those of truthful responses
(505.44± 17.39 for honest responses vs. 521.25± 17.13 ms for
deceptive responses, t (15)= 1.45, p> 0.1, Cohen’s d= 0.23). In
other words, training eliminated the difference between deceptive
and truthful responses in the second DDP task.
Regarding accuracy (see Figure 2), the same condition by
response by time by stimulus type mixed-model ANOVA revealed
only a significant main effect of response type [F(1, 45)= 80.12,
p< 0.001, η2p = 0.64], indicating deceptive responses was less
accurate than honest responses (0.93± 0.01 vs. 0.96± 0.01%).
Neither other main effect nor interaction was significant (all
ps> 0.05). The accuracy results suggested that there was no
speed-accuracy trade-off.
DISCUSSION
The present data show that behavioral RTs performance associated
with deception can be influenced significantly via instruction and
training, as evidenced by significantly decreased RTs in the sec-
ond DDP compared with the baseline performance. This pattern
of results also shows that deception is not always associated with
higher cognitive demand, as most previous studies suggested.
Results from the baseline DDP task replicated previous findings
that lying usually produces prolonged RTs when compared with
truth (Furedy et al., 1988; Walczyk et al., 2003; Hu et al., 2011; Ver-
schuere et al., 2011). The prolonged RT and reduced accuracy are
usually taken as indicators of high response conflict and cognitive
control in tasks such as the Stroop task (MacLeod and Dunbar,
1988). Evidence from neuroimaing studies also demonstrated that
when people generate deceptive responses in DDP tasks, the brain
regions associated with cognitive control and conflict monitoring
processes were more active than when participants give honest
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responses (e.g., Abe et al., 2006; for a meta-analysis, see Christ
et al., 2009).
The present data, however, suggested that instruction and train-
ing could significantly decrease the task demand associated with
deception as evidenced by reduced RTs. Specifically, the speed
up instruction alone significantly reduced the difference between
deceptive and honest responses. This result is also partially consis-
tent with one recent study, in which it was found that instruction
alone can result in speeding up RTs in an autobiographical implicit
association test (aIAT) that involves response conflict and control
(Hu et al., 2012b). Specifically, in an aIAT, participants are asked to
perform a RT-based classification task that consists of four types
of sentences: (1) true sentences (e.g., I am in front of a laptop), (2)
false sentences (e.g., I am climbing amountain), (3) crime-relevant
sentences (e.g., I stole a wallet ), and (4) crime-irrelevant sentences
(e.g., I read an article). It is hypothesized that for criminals, it will
be easier to press the same button to both crime-relevant sen-
tences and true sentences given that both have truth values (i.e.,
congruent responses) than to press the same button to both crime-
relevant sentences and false sentences (i.e., incongruent responses
that involve conflict). Thus, the aIAT examines the mental associ-
ations between criminal events and truth value. Hu et al. (2012b)
found that participants who were instructed to speed up their
RTs in the incongruent blocks were able to reverse the baseline
results pattern, i.e., showing quicker responses in the incongru-
ent blocks than congruent blocks, thus obtaining an innocent
diagnosis.
However, in the present study, participants who were similarly
instructed to speed up their responses in the deception blocks
only reduced, but did not eliminate or reverse, the differences
between deceptive and honest responses compared to the baseline
results pattern. Given this discrepancy, it is possible that the influ-
ence of instruction over one’s performance depends on the nature
of the specific type of response conflict and control involved in
the task: in the autobiographical IAT task, the stimulus-response
conflict involves in the incongruent responses concerns recently
established mental associations (e.g., mock crime that was com-
mitted 10 min or weeks before the test, see also Hu and Rosenfeld,
2012); whereas in the self-other DDP task, however, the stimulus-
response conflict involved in the deceptive responses concerns
long-term mental associations (e.g., one’s self-referential informa-
tion is always true). Indeed, De Houwer and colleagues found
that participants could successfully fake their performance of an
IAT that assessed one’s attitudes toward novel social groups (i.e.,
recently established mental associations, De Houwer et al., 2007).
Based on the discussion above, it is thus possible that the
influence of instruction over performances in deception/response
conflict tasks depends on the strength of mental associations: if the
mental associations are newly acquired or recently established, it
is likely that instruction alone will effectively help the participants
to control the response conflict and behavioral performance. If
the mental associations are established via long-term practice or
socialization, however, it is likely that instruction itself is not suf-
ficient for participants to overcome the response conflict involved
in the task.
In addition to instruction, training here played an additive
role in helping participants control their deceptive performance.
Specifically, after participants were trained to speed up their
responses in the deceptive block, the honest-deception differ-
ences in the baseline were eliminated in the post-training DDP
task. As discussed above, controlling response conflicts that are
generated from long-term associations (here self-referential infor-
mation refers to “self” instead of “other”) may require training.
Another example of response conflict that is generated from well-
established association is the Stroop task (Stroop, 1935). In the
Stroop task, people usually take longer to name the color of the
incongruent word font (e.g., press the button indicating red color
in response to the word “GREEN” printed in red color) than to
name the word meanings since people (at least adults) are auto-
matic in processing the meaning of the words (for a review, see
MacLeod, 1991). Regarding whether or not training can reduce
the Stroop effect, MacLeod and Dunbar (1988) employed a vari-
ant of the Stroop task and found that the stroop effect can be
reversed only with extensive training as long as 20 h, rather than
with relatively short training that last for 2 or 4 h.
Thus, though instruction alone is effective in reducing
responses conflict that from recently established mental associa-
tions, training seems to be necessary in reducing conflicts that are
from long established, well-practiced associations. Our results also
extended another recent study, in which the deceptive responses
could be made easier when the frequency of deceptive responses
was increased in a question set (Verschuere et al., 2011). Together
with these results, the current study, with an emphasis on training
conducted within participants, supports the view that deception is
malleable and its performance index can be voluntarily controlled
to be more automatic.
One question arising here concerns the fact that deception
seems to be more malleable than previous studies suggested (e.g.,
Johnson et al., 2005). Two possible reasons may be relevant: (1)
previous studies showed that people may lie frequently in daily
interaction (DePaulo and Bell, 1996). In other words, people may
already “practice” lies in daily life, which makes lying more mal-
leable; (2) more importantly, unlike previous studies in which
participants merely repeated the tasks without an intention to
improve (e.g. Johnson et al., 2005), participants in the present
study practiced the deceptive responses with a conscious goal to
speed up. Since mere practice (without an intention to improve)
did not significantly change participants’ task performance (Hu
et al., 2012b), it seems that instruction is a necessary element in
training-induced behavioral change.
The present data may also shed light on deception detection
studies. Specifically, if a deception detection study involves com-
parisons between unpracticed lying and truth-telling, then the
results may not generalize to situations where well-practiced lies
are involved (see also Walczyk et al., 2009). Thus, some prepara-
tions of lying may be profitably included in deception detection
studies so as to increase ecological validity.
A related question is how to better detect prepared lies.
Although we did not directly investigate this question here, some
recent findings may be helpful: (1) as in Verschuere et al. (2011)’s
study, adding filler questions that required honest responses may
increase the lie-honest differences. This is based on the premise
that increasing the predominance of one response mode (e.g.,
honest) should make the competing response mode more difficult
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(e.g., lies). Although participants may practice their lies before the
test, some build-in filler questions that required honest responses
during the test may make the prepared lies more difficult; similarly,
Hu et al. (2012a) recently found that in a concealed information
test, a higher number of irrelevant stimuli may make countermea-
sures or deliberate faking more difficult. (2) Although suspects can
prepare some lies in anticipating certain questions, asking unan-
ticipated questions for which liars may not be able to prepare may
be helpful (see Vrij et al., 2009). A third strategy is to use certain
algorithm to detect fakers based on their response patterns. For
instance, Agosta et al. (2011) recently developed an algorithm to
detect fakers in the aIAT contexts. Because of different task struc-
tures were used in the aIAT and the DDP, the algorithm cannot be
directly applied here. Moreover, participants in the Agosta et al.
(2011)’s study were asked to slow down their RTs to fake the test.
A recent study showed that the algorithm based on slowing down
RTs cannot be used in detecting fakers when they used the speed-
ing up strategy, which was adopted in the present study (Hu et al.,
2012b). Notwithstanding, future research should directly investi-
gate whether or not prepared liars can be detected using certain
abovementioned strategies.
A possible limitation of the present study is the relatively small
sample size (N= 16 in each group) we used here. However, it
should be noted that as the effect sizes we obtained here were large
(given the effect is considered as large when Cohen’s d>= 0.8),
and because large sample is usually required to observe small
effect, we reasoned that the present sample size would not ren-
der our results unstable (see also Hu et al., 2012b). Nevertheless,
future studies using large sample are necessary to replicate the
effect we obtained here. Another possible caveat is the demand
and expectancy effect may play a role here. However, it should
be mentioned that unlike many psychological research in which
the rationale/hypothesis of the study is concealed from partici-
pants, researchers in deception detection are usually interested in
examining the extent to which participants can intentionally con-
trol their behavior during the test. This required participants to
understand the rationale of the tests. This procedure is similar to
many previous studies in deception detection studies involving
countermeasures or deliberate faking strategies (e.g., Rosenfeld
et al., 2004; Verschuere et al., 2009; Agosta et al., 2011; Hu et al.,
2012b). Finally, it should be noted that although we obtained the
instruction/training effect regarding RTs, we failed to find the sim-
ilar pattern with accuracy. This may be due to the ceiling effect
for accuracy results: in each group/condition, the accuracy was
around 95%.
To conclude, this study showed that the performance of decep-
tion is malleable and becomes more automatic upon training.
Meanwhile, instruction itself plays a significant role in inducing
behavioral changes associated with deception. The results imply
that future deception detection studies should take this variation
of deception into account to better understand the complexity of
lying and the corresponding behavioral/neural patterns, and to
better identify liars.
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